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1 Introduction
In a seminal paper [9], Dow and Werlang dealt with the basic portfolio problem
under uncertainty. They proved that, given a convex capacity v and a C2 and
concave non-decreasing utility function u for a Choquet expected utility decision
maker (CEU DM), there exists an interval of prices within which an uncertainty
averse agent neither buys nor sells an asset X. The hightest price at which the
agent will buy the asset is the expected value of the asset under v (i.e. the Cho-
quet integral of X, I(X)) whereas the lowest price at which the DM sells the asset
is the expected value of selling the asset short (i.e. −I(−X)). Such a behavior is
intuitively plausible and compatible with observed investment comportment. It
contrasts with the prediction of expected utility theory under risk (see von Neu-
mann and Morgenstern [19]), according to which a strongly risk averse agent (i.e.
with a concave utility function) or equivalently a weakly risk averse agent (result
proved by Rothschild and Stiglitz [16]) will invest in an asset X if and only if the
expected value of this asset exceeds the price, and will wish to sell the asset short
if and only if the expected value is lower than its price and consequently will have
no position in the asset if and only if the price is exactly E(X) (see Arrow [3]).
In this paper, we ﬁrst generalize Dow and Werlang's result by allowing for neg-
ative prices or equally we prove that the no-trade interval result is robust when
considering assets which can yield non-positive outcomes. We also prove that this
result remains valid under weaker hypotheses, requiring only that the capacity
satisﬁes super-additivity at certainty that is, v(A) + v(Ac) ≤ 1 for any event
A instead of being convex and that u is C1 intead of being C2. We also obtain
the converse implication and so the equivalence between the no-trade interval
[I(X), −I(−X)] and the following two conditions: 1) v is super-additive at cer-
tainty and 2) u is concave.
We furthermore make precise the weak uncertainty aversion behavior of the agent
characterictic of the existence of such an interval by proving that the previous
conditions 1) and 2) are actually equivalent to: 3) attraction by perfect hedging
and 4) preference for comonotone diversiﬁcation.
Let us note that Chateauneuf and Tallon [6] showed that for a Choquet expected
utility decision maker, preference for comonotone diversiﬁcation is equivalent to
concavity of the utility function that is that conditions 2) and 4) are equiva-
lent. The proof 1) and 2) ⇒ 3) and 3)⇒ 1) is inspired by a paper of Abouda
and Chateauneuf [2] where the same result is proved but under risk for a RDEU
agent.
Finally, we show that for a CEU DM endowed with a concave non-decreasing
utility function u, super-additivity at certainty of v is equivalent to being averse
to some speciﬁc increase of uncertainty.
2
2 Deﬁnitions and notations
2.1 Elementary deﬁnitions of decision making under uncertainty
The distinction between risk (situations where there exists an objective probabil-
ity distribution, known by the decision maker) and uncertainty (situations where
there is no objective probability distribution, or it is unknown for the decision
maker) is due to Knight [12].
Under (non-probabilized) uncertainty, a decision is a mapping, called act, from
the set of states (of nature) Ω, which models the lack of information of the decision
maker, into a set of outcomes R.
Exactly one state is the "true state", the other states are not true. A decision
maker is uncertain about which state of nature is true and has not any inﬂuence
on the truth of the states.
Let (Ω,A) be a measurable space, B∞ be the set of A-measurable bounded map-
pings from Ω to R corresponding to all possible decisions and X ∈ B∞.
By %, we denote the preference relation of the decision maker on the set of all
acts B∞.
For any pair of acts X, Y, X % Y will read X is (weakly) preferred to Y by the
DM, X  Y means that X is strictly preferred to Y , and X ∼ Y means that X
and Y are considered as equivalent by the DM.
As usual, for all X, Y ∈ B∞, we write: X  Y if X % Y and not Y % X; X . Y
if Y % X; X ≺ Y if Y  X; X ∼ Y if X % Y and Y % X.
Deﬁnition 2.1 A function V : B∞ → R represents % if
X % Y ⇔ V (X) ≥ V (Y ) for all X, Y ∈ B∞.
2.2 The Choquet integral and CEU
For the preferences representation, it will be necessary to deﬁne a class of set
functions (the capacities) and to give some of their properties that will be used
in the remainder of the article.
Deﬁnition 2.2 v is a (normalized) capacity on (Ω,A) if v : A → [0, 1] is such
that v(∅) = 0, v(Ω) = 1 and ∀A, B ∈ A, A ⊂ B ⇒ v(A) ≤ v(B).
Deﬁnition 2.3 Let v be a capacity on (Ω,A), v is convex if ∀A, B ∈ A,
v(A ∪B) + v(A ∩B) ≥ v(A) + v(B).
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Deﬁnition 2.4 The Choquet integral of X ∈ B∞ with respect to the capacity v
is I(X) =
∫
Xdv where
∫
Xdv =
∫ 0
−∞ (v(X ≥ t)− 1) dt+
∫ +∞
0
(v(X ≥ t)) dt.
Deﬁnition 2.5 X, Y ∈ B∞ are comonotone if ∀s, t ∈ Ω,
(X(s)−X(t)) (Y (s)− Y (t)) ≥ 0. (i.e. X and Y vary in the same direction).
Deﬁnition 2.6 The core of a capacity v is deﬁned by
C(v) = {measure P : P (A) ≥ v(A) ∀A ∈ A, P (Ω) = v(Ω)} .
Deﬁnition 2.7 We say that Choquet expected utility applies if there exist a
utility function u : R→ R and a capacity v on (Ω,A) so that
I ◦ u : X ∈ B∞ 7→
∫
Ω
(u ◦X) dv ∈ R represents % .
In the Choquet expected utility model, preferences depend, on the one hand, on
a utility function (which reﬂects the perception of wealth) and on the other hand
on a capacity (reﬂecting the perception of the occurrence of events). This pref-
erences representation is attractive for at least two reasons: it better represents
real choices and allows for a separation between attitude towards uncertainty and
attitude towards wealth.
Note that the two attitudes are mixed in the expected utility model, where they
are both represented by the utility function.
Note also that, under risk, similar models are proposed by Kahneman and Tver-
sky [11], Quiggin [15], and Yaari [23]. These models are known under the denom-
ination of rank-dependent expected utility (RDEU).
3 Models and results
The study is focused on the case of uncertainty, that is, on non-probabilized risk
Choquet expected utility model (Schmeidler [18]). Preferences are then repre-
sented by the Choquet integral of a utility function u with respect to a capacity
v.
3.1 The result of Dow and Werlang
Let us ﬁrst present the model and the result of Dow and Werlang [9].
Let (Ω,A) be a measurable space, v be a convex capacity on A and u be a utility
function. We suppose that u is C2, u′ > 0 and u′′ ≤ 0.
The result of Dow and Werlang about the behavior of the "risk averse" or "risk
neutral" agent under uncertainty aversion, is the following:
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Theorem 3.1 (Dow and Werlang:) A risk averse (resp. risk neutral) in-
vestor with certain wealthW > 0, who is faced with an asset which yields a present
value X per unit, whose price is p > 0 per unit, will buy the asset if p < I(X)
(resp. p ≤ I(X)). He will sell the asset if p > −I(−X) (resp. p ≥ −I(−X)).
Remark 3.2 It may seem strange to call the DM "risk averse" (resp. "risk
neutral") since the framework is that of uncertainty and not risk. However, this
just means that the utility function u is concave (resp. aﬃne).
This result is very intuitive and oﬀers an appealing interpretation of the uncer-
tainty aversion in terms of pessimism since, according to a well-known theorem
of Schmeidler [17] which says that v is convex if and only if C(v) 6= ∅ and
I(X) = MinP∈C(v) EP [X], the agent views as possible the set of probabilities
above the convex capacity v and will evaluate all assets X by MinP∈C(v) EP [X].
So, when the price p is less that I(X), the DM will buy a strictly positive amount
of X since he considers that the price is lower than the worst expected value of
X.
Conversely, when the price p is greater than −I(−X), the DM will sell short a
strictly positive amount of X since he considers that the price is greater than
MaxP∈C(v) EP [X] i.e. than the best expected value of X.
Thus, he will have no position on the asset X if and only if its price p is between
I(X) and −I(−X).
The intuition behind this ﬁnding may be grasped in the following example given
by Mukerji and Tallon [14]:
Consider an asset that pays oﬀ 1 in state L and 3 in state H and assume that
the DM is of the CEU type with capacity v(L) = 0.3 and v(H) = 0.4 and linear
utility function. The expected payoﬀ (that is, the Choquet integral) of buying a
unit of the risky asset is given by I(X) = 1+(3− 1)v(H) = 1+2.0, 4 = 1, 8. The
payoﬀ from going short on a unit of the risky asset is I(−X) = −3+(3−2)v(L) =
−3+2.0, 3 = −2, 4. Hence, if the price of the asset X lies in the interval [1, 8; 2, 4],
then the investor would strictly prefer a zero position to either going short or
buying.
3.2 Generalization and extension of the result of Dow and Werlang
Let (Ω,A) be a measurable space such that A contains at least one non-trivial
events. Let B∞ be the set of bounded A-measurable mappings from Ω to R. We
consider a CEU DM with u : R→ R a C1 utility function such that u′ > 0 and
a capacity v on A, non trivial in the sense that there exists at least one event
A ∈ A such that 0 < v(A) < 1.
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Remark 3.3 Note that Dow and Werlang only considered assets for which nat-
ural reservation prices I(X) and −I(−X) are positive, so limit their study to
the natural case where the price p by unit is positive; furthermore since they also
assume that the investor is endowed with an initial deterministic positive wealth,
any inﬁnitesimal buying transaction is feasible, indeed any short selling position
is also a priori feasible. In this paper, we want to study the robustness of Dow
and Werlang's result if we relax the above restrictions on X and W. For instance,
if I(X) < 0, which would occur in case of an asset oﬀering monetary outcomes
smaller than a negative one, we wonder if considering a price p smaller than I(X)
hence negative, the DM will buy the asset. Similarly, we want to show that if the
initial wealth W is negative, then selling short an asset with positive outcomes
will occur as soon as the price p is greater than −I(−X).
Consequently from now on, we will assume that the DM is endowed with an initial
wealth W not necessarily positive. To avoid additional intricacy linked with the
interest rates, borrowing any amount of money is excluded. Accordingly the sole
impossible trading situation for the DM is when he is endowed at time 0 with a
non-positive initial wealth, when furthermore the unit price p of X is positive and
he intends buying some shares of the asset.
We will call any situation other than W ≤ 0 and p > 0 a situation of feasible
trade. We therefore obtain the following generalization of Theorem 3.1.
Theorem 3.4 The following two propositions (a) and (b) are equivalent:
(a) For any X ∈ B∞, I(X) ≤ −I(−X). For any situation of feasible trade,
the DM has no position in the asset X on the range of prices [I(X),−I(−X)],
furthermore he holds a positive amount of the asset X at prices below I(X), and
holds a short position at prices higher than −I(−X).
(b)
{
(1) v(A) + v(Ac) ≤ 1 for all A in A
(2) u is concave
Note that in contrast with Theorem 3.1, the result we obtain is an equivalence
and that it remains valid under weaker conditions (we only require v to be super-
additive at certainty i.e. v(A) + v(Ac) ≤ 1 for all A in A instead of being convex
and u to be C1 instead of being C2) and this even if non-positive prices are
considered.
Theorem 3.4 can be illustrated by the case of a company which has debts and
is near bankruptcy. A buyer will purchase the asset X although he values it
negatively (I(X) < 0) as soon as the negative price p is smaller than I(X) since
he thinks the amount of money he will receive per share (|p|) is more important
than what it will cost him (|I(X)|).
Let us now make precise the weak uncertainty aversion behavior characteristic of
the existence of such an interval.
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Theorem 3.5 A CEU DM will exhibit the no-transaction interval of Dow and
Werlang if and only if:
(3) He is attracted by perfect hedging
(i.e. [X, Y ∈ B∞, X % Y, α ∈ [0, 1], αX + (1− α)Y = a1Ω a ∈ R]⇒ a1Ω % Y ).
and
(4) He exhibits preference for comonotone diversiﬁcation
(i.e. X, Y ∈ B∞, X and Y comonotone, X ∼ Y ⇒ αX + (1 − α)Y % Y ∀α ∈
[0, 1]).
Let us note that, in the following proposition, Abouda [1] gave three equivalent
deﬁnitions of preference for perfect hedging.
Proposition 3.6 (Abouda [1]): The following assertions are equivalent:
(i) [X, Y ∈ B∞, α ∈ [0, 1], αX+(1−α)Y = a1Ω, a ∈ R]⇒ a1Ω % X or a1Ω % Y.
(ii) [X, Y ∈ B∞, X % Y, α ∈ [0, 1], αX + (1− α)Y = a1Ω, a ∈ R]⇒ a1Ω % Y.
(iii) [X, Y ∈ B∞, X ∼ Y, α ∈ [0, 1], αX + (1− α)Y = a1Ω, a ∈ R]⇒ a1Ω % Y.
Note that the implications (i) ⇒ (ii) ⇒ (iii) are obvious while to prove that
(iii)⇒ (i), we use the natural fact that for all X, Y ∈ B∞, λ ≥ 0 if X % Y then
X + λ % Y.
Remark 3.7 1) Preference for perfect hedging means that if the decision maker
can attain certainty by a convex combination of two assets, then he prefers cer-
tainty to one of these assets, which is one of the mildest requirements for uncer-
tainty aversion, so we can also call it attraction for certainty.
2) Comonotone diversiﬁcation is nothing but convexity of preferences restricted
to comonotone random variables (see Schmeidler [18]), it is therefore a kind of
uncertainty aversion. Note that any hedging (in the sense of Wakker [22]) is
prohibited in this diversiﬁcation operation. This type of diversiﬁcation turns out
to be equivalent, in the CEU model, to the concavity of u.
3.3 Relating uncertainty aversion behavior
Deﬁnition 3.8 A DM is symmetrical monotone uncertainty averse (SMUA) if
for all X, Y ∈ B∞, X %SM Y ⇒ X % Y where X %SM Y means that there
exists Z ∈ B∞, Z comonotone with X such that I(Z) = I(−Z) and Y = X + Z.
Y represents a monotone symmetrical increase of uncertainty in relation toX. So,
a DM is symmetrical monotone uncertainty averse if he doesn't like the monotone
symmetrical increase of uncertainty i.e. if he always prefers X to Y.
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A similar notion of monotone symmetrical risk aversion was already deﬁned by
Abouda and Chateauneuf [2] for a RDEU agent.
A RDEU agent is said to be symmetrical monotone risk averse (SMRA) if for all
X, Y ∈ B∞, X %SM Y ⇒ X % Y where X %SM Y means that there exists
Z ∈ B∞, Z comonotone with X such that E(Z) = 0, Z =d −Z and Y =d X+Z.
Note that in the previous deﬁnition, the condition I(Z) = I(−Z) is equivalent to
E(Z) = 0 when v is a probability measure.
Theorem 3.9 For a CEU DM with u : R → R a C1 non-decreasing non-
constant concave utility mapping and a non trivial capacity v on A, the following
two assertions are equivalent:
(1) v(A) + v (Ac) ≤ 1 for all A in A.
(5) The DM is SMUA
4 Concluding comments
After recalling the pioneering result of Dow and Werlang on the no-trade interval
of a CEU DM, we generalize this result by allowing for negative prices. We also
prove that a DM will exhibit this no-trade interval if and only if he is attracted
by perfect hedging and has preference for comotone diversiﬁcation or equivalently
if he presents some kind of uncertainty aversion and satiﬁes the super-additivity
at certainty. Finally, we show that for a CEU DM endowed with a concave non-
decreasing utility function, super-additivity at certainty is equivalent to being
SMUA.While Dow andWerlang only considered positive initial wealth and prices,
we generalize their result by allowing for non-positivity. Our goal was achieved
under the assumption that borrowing was excluded. We intend in the future to
study the robustness of our results if this restriction is removed.
5 Appendix
We now give two technical lemmas which will be useful in the sequel:
Lemma 5.1 Let Y ∈ B∞, u : R→ R be C1 non-decreasing and let
g : α ∈ R→ g(α) = I(u(W + αY )) ∀W ∈ R. Then, g′+(0) exists and
g′+(0) = u
′(W )I(Y )
Proof :
Let α > 0, from the mean value theorem, there exists t ∈ [0, 1]Ω such that
u(W + αY )− u(W )
α
= u′(W + tαY )Y.
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It follows from positive homogeneity and constant additivity of the Choquet in-
tegral that
g(α)− g(0)
α
=
∫
Ω
u′(W + tαY )Y dv.
Note that W + tαY converges to W in B∞ when α goes to zero. Hence since u′
is continuous and Y ﬁxed, u′(W+tαY )Y converges to u′(W )Y in B∞ when α ↓ 0.
Since I is norm-continuous on B∞,
∫
Ω
u′(W+tαY )Y dv converges to
∫
Ω
u′(W )Y dv
when α ↓ 0.
And since u′(W ) ≥ 0 and ∫
Ω
u′(W )Y dv = u′(W )
∫
Ω
Y dv, g′+(0) = u
′(W )I(Y ).
uunionsq
Lemma 5.2 Let Y ∈ B∞, and u : R → R be a non-decreasing C1 concave
utility mapping and W in R. If α ≥ 0 and I(Y ) ≤ 0 then W + αY . W.
Proof :
Let us suppose that α > 0 and I(Y ) ≤ 0, then αI(Y ) ≤ 0 and soW+αI(Y ) ≤ W.
By comonotonicity, I (W + αY ) ≤ W.
Since u is non-decreasing, u (I (W + αY )) ≤ u(W ).
But, since u is concave and non-decreasing, we can use Jensen's inequality for
capacities proved by Asano [4] Theorem 4 p. 231 to obtain:
I (u (W + αY )) ≤ u (I (W + αY ))
and so
I (u (W + αY )) ≤ u(W ) = I(u(W )) i.e. W + αY . W.
uunionsq
Proof of Theorem 3.4:
We ﬁrst prove that (b) implies (a):
? Let us prove that (b) (1) implies that for all X ∈ B∞, I(X) ≤ −I(−X).
Let X ∈ B∞, then
I(X) =
∫ 0
−∞
(v (X ≥ t)− 1) dt+
∫ +∞
0
v (X ≥ t) dt.
Note that, since t 7→ v(X ≤ t) is non-decreasing, the set of its discontinuities is
at most countable.
Therefore, for a < b,
∫ b
a
v(X ≤ t)dt = ∫ b
a
v(X < t)dt.
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Thus,
I(−X) = ∫ 0−∞ (v (X ≤ −t)− 1) dt+ ∫ +∞0 v (X ≤ −t) dt
=
∫ 0
−∞ (v (X < −t)− 1) dt+
∫ +∞
0
v (X < −t) dt
= − ∫ 0
+∞ (v (X < t)− 1) dt−
∫ −∞
0
v (X < t) dt
=
∫ 0
−∞ v (X < t) dt+
∫ +∞
0
(v (X < t)− 1) dt
Thus,
I(X) + I(−X) = ∫R (v (X < t) + v (X ≥ t)− 1) dt
≤ 0 since by hypothesis v(A) + v(Ac) ≤ 1 for all A in A
i.e. I(X) ≤ −I(−X).
? We now turn to the no-trade interval result.
Indeed all the proofs below make sense only in case of feasible trades, and conse-
quently are valid as stated in Theorem 3.4, only in these cases.
Let us ﬁrst prove that if p ≥ I(X), the investor is at least as well oﬀ not holding
the asset, as buying any positive amount α.
Note that for any p, buying any positive amount α of the asset leads to the
uncertain future wealth W (α) = W + α(X − p).
The formula is clearly true if p = 0.
If p > 0, buying a positive amount α of the asset at price p requires an amount
of money αp > 0, hence W (α) = W − αp+ αX = W + α(X − p).
If p < 0, buying αX yields a gain equal to −αp, so W (α) = W −αp+αX, hence
W (α) = W + α(X − p).
In order to show that the investor prefers not to buy, it is then enough to see
that W +α(X−p) . W if α > 0, but this results directly from Lemma 5.2, since
I(X − p) = I(X)− p ≤ 0.
Let us now prove that if p ≤ −I(−X), the investor is at least as well oﬀ not
selling short the asset, as selling short any positive amount α.
Note that for any p, selling short any positive amount α of the asset leads to the
uncertain future wealth W˜ (α) = W + α(−X + p).
The formula is clearly true if p = 0.
If p > 0, selling short αX yields a gain equal to αp, so W˜ (α) = W +αp+α(−X),
hence W˜ (α) = W + α(−X + p).
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If p < 0, selling short a positive amount α of the asset at price p requires an
amount of money −αp > 0, hence W˜ (α) = W + αp− αX = W + α(p−X).
In order to show that the investor prefers not to sell short, it is then enough to
see that W +α(p−X) . W if α > 0, but this results from Lemma 5.2, by setting
Y = p−X; actually I(Y ) = p+ I(−X) ≤ 0.
It remains to prove that if p < I(X) the DM will hold a positive amount α of the
asset and that if p > −I(−X), he will hold a short position α > 0.
Assume now that p < I(X). We only need to show that W (α)  W (0) = W for
some α > 0 or equally that g(α) = I (u (W + α (X − p))) > g(0) for some α > 0.
From Lemma 5.1, g′+(0) = u
′(W )I(X − p) hence g′+(0) > 0, which completes the
proof.
Finally let p > −I(−X). We only need to show that W˜ (α)  W˜ (0) = W for
some α > 0 or equally that g(α) = I (u (W + α (p−X))) > g(0) for some α > 0.
From Lemma 5.1, g′+(0) = u
′(W )I(p−X) hence g′+(0) > 0, which completes the
proof.
We now prove that (a) implies (b):
? Let us prove that if I(X) + I(−X) ≤ 0 for all X in B∞ then v(A) + v(Ac) ≤ 1
for all A in A :
Let A ∈ A, and let X = 1A. We have:
I(X) =
∫
Ω
Xdv = v(X = 1) = v(A).
I(−X) = −1 + v(X = 0) = −1 + v(Ac).
But since I(X) + I(−X) ≤ 0 by hypothesis, v(A) + v(Ac) ≤ 1.
? Let us prove that u is concave:
Let A ∈ A such that 0 < v(A) < 1, x, y ∈ R such that y < x, X = x1A + y1Ac
and t = v(A).
We have
I(X) = y + (x− y)t = tx+ (1− t)y.
Let W = p = I(X) = tx+(1− t)y and α = 1, note that since W = p, we are in a
situation of feasible trade, so according to (a), p = I(X) implies W +α(X−p) .
W
i.e. I (u (W +X − p)) ≤ u(W ).
Consequently
I(u(X)) ≤ u(tx+ (1− t)y).
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On the other hand, since u is non-decreasing,
I(u(X)) = u(y) + (u(x)− u(y))t.
Therefore,
u(y) + (u(x)− u(y))t ≤ u(tx+ (1− t)y)
i.e. tu(x) + (1− t)u(y) ≤ u(tx+ (1− t)y).
From this, we conclude that u is concave by a result due to Hardy, Littlewood and
Polya (see Wakker [20]) which states that, for a continuous function, it is enough
to satisfy the concavity inequality for one t ∈ (0, 1) in order to be concave. uunionsq
Proof of Theorem 3.5:
By theorem 3.4, it is enough to prove that (1) and (2) is equivalent to (3) and
(4).
Chateauneuf and Tallon [6] showed that for a Choquet expected utility decision
maker, preference for comonotone diversiﬁcation is equivalent to the concavity of
the utility function i.e. that conditions 2) and 4) are equivalent. The proof that
1) and 2)⇒ 3) and 3)⇒ 1) is inspired by a paper of Abouda and Chateauneuf [2]
where the same result is proved but under risk for a RDEU agent.
? Let us prove that (1) and (2) implies (3) (cf. Abouda and Chateauneuf [2]
theorem 3.8 (iii) ⇒ (v)):
Let X, Y ∈ B∞, X % Y, and α ∈ [0, 1], such that αX + (1− α)Y = a1Ω, a ∈ R.
We want to prove that a1Ω % Y i.e. u(a) ≥ I(u(Y )).
Since u is concave and non-decreasing, Jensen's inequality implies hat
I(u(X)) ≤ u(I(X))
and
I(u(Y )) ≤ u(I(Y )).
Furthermore, since X % Y , I(u(Y )) ≤ I(u(X)).
So, I(u(Y )) ≤Min(u(I(X)), u(I(Y ))).
Furthermore, if I(X) ≥ I(Y ) (resp. I(Y ) ≥ I(X)) then I(a1Ω) ≥ I(Y ) (resp.
I(a1Ω) ≥ I(X)).
Indeed: if I(X) ≥ I(Y ) then
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I(Y ) = αI(Y ) + (1− α)I(Y )
≤ I(αX) + I((1− α)Y )) since I(X) ≥ I(Y )
≤ −I(−αX) + I((1− α)Y )) since v(A) + v(Ac) ≤ 1 ∀A implies I(X) ≤ −I(−X) ∀X
≤ −I((1− α)Y − a1Ω) + I((1− α)Y )) since αX + (1− α)Y = a1Ω
= I(a1Ω).
So,
Min(I(X), I(Y )) ≤ I(a1Ω) = a.
Since u is non-decreasing,
Min(u(I(X)), u(I(Y ))) = u(Min(I(X), I(Y ))) ≤ u(a)
and so
I(u(Y )) ≤ u(a) i.e. a1Ω % Y.
? Let us prove that (3) implies (1) (cf. Abouda and Chateauneuf [2] theorem 3.8
(v) ⇒ (iii)):
By contradiction: Suppose that there exists A in A such that v(A) + v(Ac) > 1.
Note that this implies v(A) > 0 and v(Ac) > 0.
Let a ∈ R,  > 0,
X = (a− v(Ac))1A + (a+ v(A))1Ac
and
Y = (a+ v(A
c))1A + (a− v(A))1Ac .
Thus,
1
2
(X + Y) = a (1A + 1Ac) = a1Ω.
and since u is non-decreasing,
I (u (X)) = u (a− v(Ac)) + (u (a+ v(A))− u (a− v(Ac))) v(Ac)
i.e. I (u (X)) = (u (a− v(Ac))) (1− v(Ac)) + u (a+ v(A)) v(Ac).
Furthermore,
I(u(a)1Ω) = u(a) = u(a) (1− v(Ac)) + u(a)v(Ac).
So,
I (u (X))−I(u(a)1Ω) = (1− v(Ac)) (u (a− v(Ac))− u(a))+v(Ac) (u (a+ v(A))− u(a)) .
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By a Taylor expansion of order 1, we obtain:
u (a− v(Ac))− u(a) = −v(Ac)u′(a) + ◦1()
u (a+ v(A))− u(a) = v(A)u′(a) + ◦2()
So,
I (u (X))− I(u(a)1Ω) = (1− v(Ac)) (−v(Ac)u′(a) + ◦1()) + v(Ac) (v(A)u′(a) + ◦2())
= 
[
v(Ac)u′(a) (v(A) + v(Ac)− 1) + ◦1()

− ◦1()

v(Ac) + ◦2()

v(Ac)
]
=  [v(Ac)u′(a) (v(A) + v(Ac)− 1) + β()] with lim→0β() = 0.
But, since v(A) + v(Ac) > 1, u′(a) > 0 and v(Ac) > 0, ∃1 > 0 with
I (u (X))− I(u(a)1Ω) > 0 if  ∈ (0, 1] .
We obtain in the same way that
I (u (Y))− I(u(a)1Ω) > 0 if  ∈ (0, 2] for some 2 > 0.
Then, taking  = min (1, 2) , we obtain a1Ω ≺ X and a1Ω ≺ Y which contra-
dicts perfect hedging.
? Let us prove that (2) implies (4) (cf. Chateauneuf and Tallon [6] theorem 3 (ii)
⇒ (i)):
Let X, Y ∈ B∞ be comonotone and such that X ∼ Y and let α ∈ (0, 1).
We want to prove that αX +(1−α)Y % Y i.e. I(u(αX +(1−α)Y )) ≥ I(u(Y )).
Thus,
I(u(Y )) = αI(u(Y )) + (1− α)I(u(Y ))
= αI(u(X)) + (1− α)I(u(Y )) since X ∼ Y
= I(αu(X) + (1− α)u(Y )) since u is non− decreasing and so preserves comonotony
≤ I(u(αX + (1− α)Y )) since u is concave.
? Let us prove that (4) implies (2):
The proof given on R++ by Chateauneuf and Tallon for (i) ⇒ (ii) in theorem 3
of [6] remains valid on R, hence (4) implies (2). uunionsq
Proof of Theorem 3.9:
? Let us prove that (1) implies (5):
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Let X, Y ∈ B∞ with X %SM Y, so that there exists Z ∈ B∞ comonotone with
X such that I(Z) = I(−Z) and Y = X + Z.
We want to prove that X % Y i.e. I(u(X)) ≥ I(u(Y )).
1. Suppose that for all t ∈ Ω, Z(t) ≥ 0.
For t ∈ Ω such that Z(t) > 0, since u is concave, we have
u(X(t) + Z(t))− u(X(t))
Z(t)
≤ u′(X(t)) ≤M := supx∈X(Ω)u′(x).
M is ﬁnite since u′ is continuous and X bounded. Also M ≥ 0 since u′ ≥ 0.
So, u(X(t) + Z(t)) ≤ u(X(t)) +MZ(t) ∀t ∈ Ω such that Z(t) > 0.
This inequality is also obviously true for t such that Z(t) = 0.
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2. Suppose that for all t ∈ Ω, Z(t) ≤ 0.
For t ∈ Ω such that Z(t) < 0, since u is concave, we have
u(X(t))− u(X(t) + Z(t))
−Z(t) ≥ u
′(X(t)) ≥ m := infx∈X(Ω)u′(x).
For the same reason as in 1., 0 ≤ m ≤ +∞.
So, u(X(t) + Z(t)) ≤ u(X(t)) +mZ(t) ∀t ∈ Ω such that Z(t) < 0.
This inequality is also obviously true for t such that Z(t) = 0.
3. Suppose that there exist s and t in Ω such that Z(s) < 0 and Z(t) > 0.
Since Z is comonotone with X, X(t)−X(s) ≥ 0.
Furthermore, since u is concave,
u(X(t) + Z(t))− u(X(t))
Z(t)
≤ u(X(s))− u(X(s) + Z(s))−Z(s) (α)
Let M ′ = SupF
{
u(X(t)+Z(t))−u(X(t))
Z(t)
}
where F = {t ∈ Ω | Z(t) > 0} .
Clearly M ′ ≥ 0 since u is non-decreasing.
We have, thanks to (α), for all s, t ∈ Ω such that Z(s) < 0 and Z(t) > 0,
u(X(t) + Z(t))− u(X(t))
Z(t)
≤M ′ ≤ u(X(s))− u(X(s) + Z(s))−Z(s)
and then
u(X(t) + Z(t)) ≤ u(X(t)) +M ′Z(t) ∀t | Z(t) > 0
u(X(s) + Z(s)) ≤ u(X(s)) +M ′Z(s) ∀s | Z(s) < 0
We also have the same inequality if Z(s) = 0 or Z(t) = 0.
Therefore, in all cases, there exists an M ≥ 0 such that
u(X + Z) ≤ u(X) +MZ.
So, since Y = X + Z and u(X) is comonotone with MZ,
I(u(Y )) = I(u(X + Z)) ≤ I(u(X) +MZ) = I(u(X)) +MI(Z).
Since v(A) + v (Ac) ≤ 1 for all A in A, I(Z) + I(−Z) ≤ 0 (see theorem 3.4)
and since I(Z) = I(−Z), I(Z) ≤ 0.
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Thus,
I(u(Y )) ≤ I(u(X)) +MI(Z) ≤ I(u(X)) i.e. X % Y.
? Let us prove that (5) implies (1):
Let x ∈ R such that u′(x) > 0, 0 <  and A ∈ A.
If v(A) = 1 and v(Ac) = 0, there is nothing to prove.
Otherwise 1 + v(Ac)− v(A) > 0, which we will assume from now on.
Let
Y = (x− )1A +
(
x+
v(Ac)− v(A)− 1
v(A)− v(Ac)− 1
)
1Ac
and
Z = −1A + v(A
c)− v(A)− 1
v(A)− v(Ac)− 11Ac .
One can easily check that I (Z) = I (−Z) and therefore x1Ω %SM Y.
I(u (Y) = u(x− ) +
(
u
(
x+
v(Ac)− v(A)− 1
v(A)− v(Ac)− 1
)
− u(x− )
)
v(Ac)
Since the DM is SMUA and x1Ω %SM Y, I (u (x1Ω)) ≥ I(u (Y) so that,
u(x)− u(x− )

≥ v(A
c)

(
u
(
x+
v(Ac)− v(A)− 1
v(A)− v(Ac)− 1
)
− u(x− )
)
.
Passing to the limit when  goes to 0, we obtain
u′(x) ≥ 2u
′(x)v(Ac)
1 + v(Ac)− v(A)
and since u′(x) > 0, we conclude that
1− v(A)− v(Ac)
1 + v(Ac)− v(A) ≥ 0.
And therefore,
v(A) + v(Ac) ≤ 1 since 1 + v(Ac)− v(A) > 0.
uunionsq
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